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Abstract 
This paper examines the concept of a combi­
nation rule for belief functions. It is shown 
that two fairly simple and apparently reason­
able assumptions determine Dempster's rule, 
giving a new justification for it. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Dempster's rule is the cornerstone of Dempster-Shafer 
Theory, the theory of uncertainty developed by Shafer 
[76a] from the work of Dempster [67]. The rule is used 
to combine the representations of a number of inde­
pendent evidences, to achieve a combined measure of 
belief. For the theory to be able give meaningful con­
clusions, it is essential that Dempster's rule is con­
vincingly justified. The rule and its justifications have 
been criticised from many angles, a common criticism 
being that it can be hard to know when evidences are 
independent, and indeed, what 'independence' means 
here. 
In this paper an axiomatic approach to the combina­
tion of belief functions is taken. The concept of a com­
bination rule is formulated precisely, and assumptions 
are made which determine a unique rule, Dempster's 
rule. A benefit of this approach is that it makes the in­
dependence or irrelevance assumptions explicit. Since 
the assumptions are arguably reasonable this gives a 
justification of the rule. This justification is quite dif­
ferent from previous justifications of the complete rule, 
though it is related to the justification in [Wilson, 89, 
92c] of Dempster's rule for a collection of simple sup­
port functions. 
In section 2, the mathematical framework is intro­
duced; in section 3, the concept of a combination rule is 
defined; section 4 discusses Dempster's rule and some 
of the problems with previous justifications of the rule; 
section 5 defines Bayesian conditioning, used for rep­
resenting one of the assumptions; the assumptions on 
rules of combination are defined and discussed in sec­
tion 6, and the main result of the paper, that they 
determine Dempster's rule, is given. 
2 SOURCE STRUCTURESAND 
BELIEF FUNCTIONS 
In this section the basic concepts are introduced. The 
mathematical framework is essentially that of [Demp­
ster, 67] with different notation (and minor differences) 
but some fundamental issues are considered in greater 
detail. 
2.1 SOME BASIC CONCEPTS 
We will be interested in sets of propositions and con­
sidering measures of belief over these. 
Definition: Frame 
A frame is defined to be a finite set1• 
Without loss of generality, it will be assumed that 
frames are subsets of the set of natural numbers,2 IN. 
The intended interpretation of a frame is a set of mu­
tually exclusive and exhaustive propositions. Then the 
set of subsets of a frame 0, written as 2°, is a boolean 
algebra of propositions. 
1'Frame' is an abbreviation for Shafer's term 'frame of 
discernment' [Shafer, 76a]; [Dempster 67, 68] and [Shafer, 
79] allow frames to be infinite; however the results here 
only apply to finite frames of discernment. 
2 Actually any other infinite set would do; this is just to 
ensure that the collection of all multiple source structures 
(defined later) is a set. 
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Definition: (Additive) Probability Function 
Let 0 be a frame. P is said to be a probability function 
over 0 if P is a function from 2° to [ 0, 1] such that 
(i) P(O) = 1, and (ii) (additivity) for all A, B � 0 
such that An B = 0, P(A U B) = P(A) + P(B). 
We are interested in the propositions in 2°, for frame 
e. Dempster, in his key paper [Dempster, 67] consid­
ers a situation where we have a probability function 
over a related frame 0 representing Bayesian beliefs. 
Definition: Source Structure 
A source structure3 S over frame e is a triple (0, P, I), 
where n and e are frames (known as the underlying 
frame and frame of interest respectively) P (known 
as the underlying probability function) is a proba­
bility function over 0, and compatibility function I 
(Dempster's multi-valued mapping) is a function from 
0 to 2°. Furthermore, for w E 0, if I(w) :::: 0, then 
P(w) == 0. 
The interpretation of Sis as follows. The set of propo­
sitions we are interested in is 2°, but we have no un­
certain information directly about e. Instead we have 
a subjective additive measure of belief P over 0, and a 
logical connection between the frames given by I: we 
know that, for w E 0, if w is true, then I(w) is also 
true. Here it is assumed that P is made with knowl­
edge of I. 
The reason for the last condition in the definition is 
that if w is true then I(w) is true; however, if I(w) :::: 0 
then, since 0 is the contradictory proposition, w cannot 
be true, so must be assigned zero probability. 
Since it is frame e that we are interested in, we need 
to extend our uncertain information about 0 to 2°. 
Associated with the source structure S is a belief func­
tion and mass function over e (see [Shafer, 76a] for the 
definitions of these terms) defined, for X � e by 
m8(X) = L P(w) 
wE!l:J(w)=X 
Be18(X) = L P(w). 
wE!l:J(w)!";X 
Bel8 is the extension of the uncertain information 
given by P, via the compatibility function I, to the 
frame e. It is viewed as a subjective measure of belief 
over e, and is generally non-additive. 
2.2 THE CONNECTION BETWEEN 
SOURCE STRUCTURES AND BELIEF 
FUNCTIONS 
In his book, a mathematical theory of of evidence 
[Shafer, 76a], Shafer re-interprets Dempster's frame-
3See also 'Dempster spaces' in [Hajek et al., 9'2). 
work, and focuses on belief functions (the lower prob­
abilities in Dempster's framework). The relationship 
between Dempster's and Shafer's frameworks is fairly 
straight-forward, but for clarity the connection will be 
described here. Although this paper deals primarily 
with source structures, and justifies Dempster's rule 
within Dempster's framework, these results also ap­
ply to Shafer's framework, using the correspondence 
between the two. 
Proposition 
Function Bel : 2° --> [ 0, 1] is a belief function if and 
only if there exists a source structure S over e with 
Bel8 = Bel. 
Each belieffunction has a unique associated mass func­
tion, and vice versa. The focal elements of a belief 
function are the subsets of the frame which have non­
zero mass. Let us define the focal elements of a source 
structureS= (0, P, I) over e to be the subsets A of e 
such that I(w) ==A for some wE 0 such that P(w)#O. 
It can easily be seen that the set of focal elements of 
S is the same as the set of focal elements of Bel8. 
From any belief function Bel, one can generate a source 
structure by letting 0 be a set in 1-1 correspondence 
with the set of focal elements, and defining the under­
lying probability function and compatibility function 
in the obvious way. 
Though the underlying frame may be more abstract 
than the frame of interest, the natural occurrences of 
belief functions generally seem to have an intrinsic un­
derlying frame. Even Shafer, who in his book does 
away with the underlying frame, uses a Dempster-type 
framework in later work, for example in his random 
codes justification of Dempster's rule. 
2.3 EXTENSION TO DIFFERENT 
FRAMES OF INTEREST 
It is assumed here that all the source structures we 
are interested in combining are over the same frame. 
This is not really a restriction since if they are over 
different frames, we can take a common refinement e 
of all the frames (see [Shafer, 76a, chapter 6]). All the 
source structures can then be re-expressed as source 
structures over e' and we can proceed as before. 
3 COMBINATION RULES 
Crucial to Shafer's and Dempster's theories is combi­
nation of belief functions/source structures. The idea 
is that the body of evidence is broken up into small, 
(intuitively) independent pieces, the impact of each 
individual piece of evidence is represented by a belief 
function, and the impact of the whole body of evidence 
is calculated by combining these belief functions using 
Dempster's rule. 
Informally, a combination rule is a mapping which 
takes a collection of source structures and gives a 
source structure, which is intended to represent the 
combined effect of the collection; the combined mea­
sures of belief in propositions of interest can then be 
calculated. If possible we would like to make natural 
assumptions that determine a uniquely sensible com­
bination rule. 
3.1 COMBINING SOURCE STRUCTURES 
First a collection of source structures must be for­
mally represented. This is done using a multiple source 
structure. 
Definition: Jl4ultiple Source Structures 
A multiple source structure s over frame 0 is defined 
to be a function with finite domain '1/J" C IN, which 
maps each i E '1/J" to a source structure over 0; we 
write s( i) as the triple (Qi, Pi, I!). 
There are some collections of source structures that 
give inconsistent information. This leads to the fol­
lowing definition, which is justified in section 6. 
Definition: Combinable 
Multiple source structures (over some frame) is said to 
be combinable if there exist Wi En: (for each i E '1/J") 
with P:(w;):f:O and niE'I/I' If(w;):f:0. 
Definition: Combination Rule 
Let C be the set of all combinable multiple source 
structures (over any frames). A combination rule II 
is defined to be a function with domain C such that, 
for sEC over frame 0, II(s) is a source structure over 
e. 
3.2 THE DIFFERENT COMPONENTS OF 
A COMBINATION RULE 
It turns out that there are easy, natural choices for two 
of the three components of a combination rule, the two 
logical components. 
. 
Definition 
For multiple source structure s, 
(i) ns is defined to be niE.P' n:. An element w of n· 
is a function with domain '1/J" such that w( i) E Of. The 
element w( i) will usually be written w;. 
(ii) The compatibility function I8 is given by P(w) = 
niE,P' lf(w;). 
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(i) The Underlying Fl.·ame 
Let us interpret element w E n· as meaning that Wi is 
true for all i E ,p•. n• is exhaustive, since each Qi is 
exhaustive, and every combination is considered; the 
elements of n• are mutually exclusive since any two 
different ws differ in at least one co-ordinate i, and the 
elements of Of are mutually exclusive. Therefore we 
can use n• as the underly ing frame for the combina­
tion. (Some of the elements of the product space may 
well be known to be impossible, using the compatibil­
ity functions, so a smaller underlying frame could be 
used, but this makes essentially no difference). 
(ii) The Combined Compatibility Function 
For w E n•) if w is true, then Wi ( E nn is true for 
each i E ¢•, which implies It (w;) is true for each i, so 
nie..P· It is true (since intersection of sets in 2e corre­
sponds to conjunction of propositions). Assuming we 
have no other information about dependencies between 
underlying frames, this is the strongest proposition we 
can deduce from w. Thus compatibility functions It 
generate compatibility function I" on n·. 
(iii) The Combined Underlying Probability 
Function 
This is the hard part of the combination rule so it is 
convenient to consider this part on its own, defining 
a C-rule to be the third component of a combination 
rule. 
Definition: C-rule 
A C-rule 1r is defined to be a function, with domain the 
set of all combinable multiple source structures, which 
acts on a combinable multiple source structure s over 
some frame 0 and produces an additive probability 
function over Q$. We write the probability function 
1r( s) as 1!'3• 
4 DEMPSTER'S RULE OF 
COMBINATION4 
In this section Dempster's rule is expressed within the 
framework of this paper, and previous justifications 
are discussed. 
4This refers to the rule described in [Shafer, 76a] and 
the combination rule in [Dempster, 67), not the amended 
non-normalised version of the rule, suggested in [Smets, 
88), which is sometimes, confusingly, also referred to as 
'Dempster's rule'. 
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4.1 DEMPSTER'S COMBINATION RULE 
AND C-RULE 
Definition: the Dempster C-rule 
The Dempster C-rule 7rDs is defined as follows. For 
combinable multiple source structure s, and w E 06, if 
P(w) = 0 then 7riJ8(w) = 0, else 
7r.b8(w) = K IT P:(wi), 
iE1fJ• 
where K is a constant (i.e., independent of w) chosen 
such that 7riJ8(n•) = 1 (as it must for 7rvs to be a 
probability function). 
Definition: the Dempster Combination Rule 
The Dempster Combination Rule acts on multi­
ple source structure s to give source structure 
(06' 7rns• J6). 
It is easy to see that this is the combination rule used 
in [Dempster, 67] and corresponds to 'Dempster's rule' 
in (Shafer, 76a]. 
Justification of Dempster's rule therefore amounts to 
justifying the Dempster C-rule 7rDS· 
In section 6 the Dempster C-rule is justified by consid­
ering a set of constraints and assumptions on C-rules 
that determine a unique C-rule. 
4.2 DISCUSSION OF JUSTIFICATIONS 
OF DEMPSTER'S RULE 
Dempster's explanation of his rule in (Dempster, 67] 
amounts to assuming independence (so that for any 
w E 06' the propositions represented by Wj for i E 1/J' 
are considered to be independent) thus generating the 
product probability function P(w) == TiiE1fJ• Pi(wi), for 
w E n•. If I' ( w) is empty then w cannot be true, so P 
is then conditioned on the set {w : J'(w)¥:0}, leading 
to Dempster's rule. 
This two stage process. of firstly assuming indepen­
dence, and then conditioning on I'(w) being non­
empty, needs to be justified. The information given 
by J• is a dependence between Wi for i E 1/;6, so they 
clearly should not be assumed to be independent if this 
dependence is known. Ruspini's justification [Ruspini, 
87] also appears not to deal satisfactorily with this 
crucial point. 
A major weakness of a mathematical theory of evidence 
is that the numerical measures of belief are not given a 
clear interpretation, and Dempster's rule is not prop­
erly justified. This is rectified in (Shafer, 81] with his 
random codes canonical examples. 
Shafer's Random Codes Canonical Examples 
Here the underlying frame n is a set of codes. An 
agent randomly picks a particular code w with chance 
P(w) and this code is used to encode a true statement, 
which is represented by a subset of some frame e. We 
know the set of codes and the chances of each being 
picked, but not the particular code picked, so when we 
receive the encoded message we decode it with each 
code w' E n in turn to yield a message J(w') (which is 
a subset of e for each w'). This situation corresponds 
to a source structure (0, P, J) over e. 
This leads to the desired two stage process: for if there 
are a number of agents picking codes stochastically in­
dependently and encoding true (but possibly different) 
messages then the probability distributions are (at this 
stage) independent. Then if we receive all their mes­
sages and decode them we may find certain combina­
tions of codes are incompatible, leading to the second, 
conditioning, stage. 
To use Shafer's theory to represent a piece of evidence, 
we choose the random codes canonical example (and 
associated source structure) that is most closely anal­
ogous to that piece of evidence. Two pieces of ev­
idences are considered to be independent if we can 
satisfactorily compare them to the picking of indepen­
dent random codes. However, in practice, it will often 
be very hard to say whether our evidences are analo­
gous to random codes canonical examples, and judging 
whether these random codes are independent may also 
be very hard, especially if the comparison is a rather 
vague one.5 
Shafer's justification applies only when the underlying 
probability function has meaning independently of the 
compatibility function, that is, when the compatibil­
ity function is transitory (Shafer, 92] (see also [Wilson, 
92b] for some discussion of this point). Many occur­
rences of belief functions are not of this form. The 
justification given in this paper opens up the possibil­
ity of justifying Dempster's rule for other cases. 
The Non-Normalised Version of Dempster's 
Rule 
The non-normalised version of Dempster's rule [Smets, 
88, 92) is simpler mathematically so it is less hard 
to find mathematical assumptions that determine it. 
However, whether these assumptions are reasonable or 
not is another matter. Smets considers that the un­
normalised rule applies when the frame is interpreted 
as a set of mutually exclusive propositions which are 
not known to be exhaustive. Such a frame can be rep­
resented by a conventional frame, by adding an extra 
element representing the proposition which is true if 
and only if all the other propositions (represented by 
50ther criticisms of this justification are given in the 
various comments on [Shafer, 82a, 82b], and in [Levi, 83]. 
other elements of the frame) are false, thus restoring 
exhaustivity. Therefore Smets' non-exhaustive frames 
are unnecessary (and are restrictive). 
Smets also attempts to justify (the normalised) Demp­
ster's rule using the unnormalised rule by 'closed-world 
conditioning' [Smets, 88], i.e., combining the belief 
functions as if the frame was not known to be exhaus­
tive, and then conditioning on the frame being exhaus­
tive after all. This suffers from a similar problem to 
that faced by Dempster's justification (see above dis­
cussion), and seems very unsatisfactory: if we know 
that the frame is exhaustive then this information 
should be taken into account at the beginning (and 
then Smets' justification does not apply)-pretending 
temporarily that the frame is not exhaustive is per­
verse and liable to lead to unreliable results. 
See also [Dubois and Prade, 86; Hajek, 92; Klawonn 
and Schwecke, 92]. 
5 BAYESIAN CONDITIONING 
In this section Bayesian conditioning of source 
structures6 is defined; these are used to simply express 
assumption (A) in section 6. 
Definition: Bayesian Conditioning of a 
Probability Function 
Let P be an (additive) probability function over set 
n, and let A � n be such that P(A);iO. Then the 
probability function P � over A. is defined by 
P(f) P�(f) = P(A) for r � A. 
This is used for conditioning on certain evidence A. 
Note that if A is considered to be certain, and n is a 
frame, then A is also a frame. 
Definition: Bayesian Conditioning of a Source 
Structure 
Let S = (Q, P, I) be a source structure over frame 0 
and let A � n (representing certain evidence) be such 
that P(A);iO. Then s� is defined to be the source 
structure (A, P �,I�), where I� is I restricted to A. 
This should be uncontroversial, given that the judge­
ment of the underlying epistemic probability P is made 
with knowledge of the compatibility function. 
Incidentally if, for source structure S = (0, P, I) over 
0 and A � 0, we let A = {wEn : I(w) � A} 
then S � corresponds to geometric conditioning by A 
[Shafer, 76b; Suppes and Zanotti, 77]. 
6This is not closely related to Bayesian updating of a 
belieffunction [Kyburg, 87; Jatfray, 92] 
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Definition: Product Subsets 
Let s be a multiple source structure. A is said to 
be a product subset of n• (with respect to s) if A= 
TiiEtfJ• Ai for some 0;iAi � Of (i E ,P'). 
Note that such a representation, if it exists, is unique. 
For product subset A of 03 and i E ,P', we will write 
Ai as the projection of A into Of. 
The following is a straight-forward extension of the 
Bayesian conditioning of a source structure. 
Definition: Bayesian Conditioning of a 
Multiple Source Structure 
Let s be a multiple source structure and let A be a 
product subset of Q3 such that Pt(A;);iO for all i E 'lj;'. 
Then the multiple source structure s� is defined as 
follows: s� has domain '1/J$ and, for i E '1/J', s�(i) = 
(s(i))�. 
6 CONSTRAINTS AND 
ASSUMPTIONS ON C-RULES 
In this section we introduce two clearly natural con­
straints on C-rules, and two arguably reasonable as­
sumptions. It is shown that together these determine 
a unique C-rule, which turns out to be Dempster's C­
rule, hence justifying Dempster's rule. 
Constraint: Respecting Contradictions 
C-rule 1r is said to respect contradictions if for any 
combinable multiple source structure s and w E n•, if 
P(w) = 0 then 7r3(w) = 0. 
If I' ( w) :::: 0 then w cannot be true since w true im­
plies J• (w) true, and 0 represents the contradictory 
proposition. Therefore any sensible C-rule must re­
spect contradictions. 
Constraint: Respecting Zero Probabilities 
C-rule 1r is said to respect zero probabilities if for any 
combinable multiple source structure s and w E 0', if 
Pi (w;) = 0 for some i E '1/J', then 1!'1(w) = 0. 
If Pf ( w;) = 0 for some i then w; is considered impossi­
ble (since frames are finite), so, since w is the conjunc­
tion of the propositions w;, w should clearly have zero 
probability. 
Note that if we missed out the condition that the mul­
tiple source structure had to be 'combinable' in these 
two constraints and in the definition of a C-rule then 
these two constraints are inconsistent: for any C-rule 1r 
and any multiple source structure s which is not com­
binable, if 1r respects contradictions and zero proba-
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bilities then 7r8 (w) = 0 for any w E !.l", which is incon­
sistent with 1r8 being a probability function. 
Definition 
Let s be a multiple source structure, k E 1/J", and I E 
!.lt. Then 
Ei is defined to be {wE n• : w(k) =I}, and -.Ei is 
defined to be {wE n• : w(k)fl}, i.e., !.l"\Ei. The set 
Ei is the cylindrical extension in n• of I ( E !.lt), and 
can be thought of as expressing the event that variable 
k takes the value l. 
Definition: Assumption (A) 
C-rule 1r is said to satisfy assumption (A) if 7r respects 
zero probabilities and, for any combinable multiple 
source structure s, for any k E 1/J", I E !.lt such that 
7r8(.6.)f0, where .6. = -.EL, 
( 7r")a = 7r•a. 
Note that since 7r respects zero probabilities, if 
7r"(.6.)f0 then Pk(.6.k)f0, so s� is defined. 
In fact it can be shown that if 7r satisfies assumption 
(A) then it satisfies a more general form of the assump­
tion where .6. is allowed to be an arbitrary product 
subset of n·. 
Assumption (A) can be thought of as postulating that 
Bayesian conditioning commutes with source structure 
combination. 
Bayesian conditioning by -.Ei can be viewed (roughly 
speaking) as omitting the lth focal element from the 
kth Belief function (and scaling up the other masses). 
Assumption (A) amounts to saying that it should not 
make any difference whether we omit that focal ele­
ment before, or after, combination. 
Definition: Assumption (B) 
Let s be a combinable multiple source structure such 
that, for some k E 1/J", 
lOti= 2 and lOti= 1 fori E 1/J" \ {k}, 
and l"(w)f0 for wE n•. 
Then for IE !.lt, 
The notation hides the simplicity of this assumption. 
The multiple source structures referred to are of a very 
simple kind: one of the component source structures 
has just two elements in its underlying space, and so 
leads to a belief function with at most two focal ele­
men�s, and all the other component source structures 
give belief functions with just one focal element, so 
they can be viewed as just propositions, i.e., certain 
evidences; furthermore there is no conflict in the evi­
dences. In terms of belief functions this is the situation 
where we are conditioning a belief function with two 
masses by a subset of e. 
Assumption (B) is just that adding all the other cer­
tain sources does not change the probabilities of com­
ponent k. The rationale behind this assumption is that 
the certain evidences are not in conflict with the in­
formation summarised by the kth source structure, so 
why should they change the probabilities? 
Theorem 
7rDS is the unique C-rule respecting contradictions, 
zero probabilities and satisfying (A) and (B). 
This means that Dempster's rule of combination 
uniquely satisfies our constraints and assumptions, 
hence justifying it. 
Sketch of Proof 
Unfortunately the proof of this theorem is far too long 
to be included here. To give the reader some idea of 
the structure of the proof, it will be briefly sketched. 
It can easily be checked that 7rDS satisfies the con­
straints and assumptions. Conversely, let 7r be an ar­
bitrary C-rule satisfying the constraints and assump­
tions. First, it is shown that 7r satisfies a more gen­
eral form of (A), where .6. is allowed to be an arbi­
trary product subset of n•. This is then applied to 
the case of .6. = {w, w'} where w and w' differ in only 
one co-ordinate. In conjunction with assumption (B) 
this enables us to show that, when the denominators 
are non-zero, 
1r"(w) _ 1r8(w') 
7r_bs(w) 
-
7r.bs(w')
. 
A source structure over e is said to be discounted 
if e is a focal element of it, and a multiple source 
structure is said to be discounted if each of the source 
structures of which it is composed is discounted. It 
is then shown that, for any discounted multiple source 
structure s, 7r8 = 7r_b8, using the last result repeatedly. 
The theorem is then proved by taking an arbitrary 
combinable multiple source structure t, discounting it 
to form s (see [Shafer, 76a]) and using the more general 
form of assumption (A) again to relate 7rt and 7r8 
7r.bs. 
7 DISCUSSION 
Both assumptions (A) and (B) seem fairly reasonable. 
(A) appears to be an attractive property of a C-rule, 
but is a rather strong one, and it is not currently clear 
to me in which situations it should hold (it is conceiv­
able that there are other reasonable-seeming principles 
with which it is sometimes in conflict). Further work 
should attempt to clarify exactly when both assump­
tions are reasonable. 
There are cases where Dempster's rule can seem un­
intuitive, for example, I argued in [Wilson, 92b] that 
Dempster's rule is unreasonable at least for some in­
stances of Bayesian belief functions, and there has been 
much criticism of certain examples of the use of the 
rule e.g., [Pearl, 90a, 90b; Walley, 91; Voorbraak, 91; 
Zadeh, 84]_7 
If it does turn out that there are certain types of belief 
functions where assumption (A) or (B) is not reason­
able, then the above theorem, as it stands, is not use­
ful. However, an examination of its proof reveals that 
only two operations on belief functions/source struc­
tures are used-Bayesian conditioning (i.e, omitting 
focal elements and scaling the others up) and discount­
ing (i.e, adding a focal element equal to the frame 
e, and scaling the others down). This means that 
the proof could be used to justify Dempster's rule for 
any sub-class of belief functions/source structures (for 
which (A) and (B) may be more reasonable) which is 
closed under these operations, for example the set of 
simple support functions or the set of consonant sup­
port functions. Also, for the same reason, the proof 
could be used to justify Dempster's rule for collections 
of belief functions/multiple source structures s such 
that l3(w)-:j:.0 for all w E  f23, if (A) and (B) were con­
sidered reasonable here. 
It might also be interesting to investigate alternatives 
to (B), which give different values for 11'3(Ek) than 
those given in (B). The proof of the theorem can be 
modified to show that there is at most one C-rule 
satisfying the constraints and assumptions, though of 
course it will not be the Dempster C-rule. 
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